U.S. President Donald Trump arrived at NATO’s annual summit in Ankara, Turkey, earlier this month aboard a Qatari-gifted Air Force One—a newly retrofitted Boeing 747-8 that has become emblematic of American foreign policy maneuvers. During his journey, he switched between this aircraft and an older model, later telling reporters the decision was influenced by Iranian security threats, quipping, “I’m No.1 on the kill list for Iran.”
Within 48 hours, federal agents served grand jury subpoenas at the homes of four New York Times journalists who reported on security concerns surrounding the plane swap. The subpoenas cited “an alleged violation of federal criminal law,” signaling a sharp escalation in legal scrutiny.
The Air Force One drama dominated news cycles globally, overshadowing the summit’s deeper strategic implications. Holding NATO’s annual gathering in Ankara itself presents complications: geopolitical strategist George Friedman notes that “the next 100 years will see political powers rise and fall, but the basic matrix remains the same.” Russia and China will weaken as Japan, Turkey, and Poland address internal challenges and emerge stronger.
Trump has cultivated a delicate relationship with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan throughout the Iran conflict, urging Ankara to stay out of the war while offering F-35 aircraft deliveries as leverage. Reports have circulated—publicly discussed by Trump—that F-35s might be extended to Turkey contingent on Erdoğan pressuring Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa to deploy forces in Lebanon. Retired Colonel Douglas MacGregor, a former defense advisor and combat veteran, calls this “ridiculously stupid.”
MacGregor, known for his contrarian views on U.S. strategy, once stunned audiences in Israel by declaring, “There is one true potential existential threat to Israel that exists in the region, and that is the Turkish state.” His reasoning: “The Iranians can lob missiles and bombs, but the Iranians can’t invade Israel. The Turks can invade Israel—and you are living on territory that the Ottomans governed for hundreds of years.” Both former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have acknowledged Turkey as a regional rival.
If Israel views Turkey as its primary adversary and wields significant influence over U.S. decision-making—as MacGregor argues—then America functions simultaneously as NATO’s treaty partner with Turkey and the financial/military backer of a state that perceives it as an existential threat. An alliance including Turkey cannot serve as a tool to pressure Turkey itself, pushing Ankara further toward the posture MacGregor describes: technically within NATO but increasingly vulnerable to conflict with one of its allies.
Critics contend the Iran War advances a Greater Israel Project rather than U.S. interests, potentially positioning Turkey as the next target in a regional clash. Former National Counterterrorism Center director Joe Kent warned that “leaving NATO won’t be to avoid foreign entanglements; we’ll be leaving NATO so we can side with Israel when Turkey & Israel eventually clash in Syria.”
The Ankara summit—hosted by a nation Israel privately considers an adversary, attended by a president whose aircraft movements ignited legal investigations and four journalist subpoenas—exemplifies the complex diplomatic tensions defining this era.
